Accuracy arguments are the en vogue route in epistemic justifications of probabilism and further norms governing rational belief. These arguments often depend on the fact that the employed inaccuracy measure is strictly proper. I argue controversially that it is ill-advised to assume that the employed inaccuracy measures are strictly proper and that strictly proper statistical scoring rules are a more natural class of measures of inaccuracy. Building on work in belief elicitation I show how strictly proper statistical scoring rules can be used to give an epistemic justification of probabilism. An agent's evidence does not play any role in these justifications of probabilism. Principles demanding the maximisation of a generalised entropy depend on the agent's evidence. In the second part of the paper I show how to simultaneously justify probabilism and such a principle. I also investigate scoring rules which have traditionally been linked with entropies.
Introduction and Notation
We are joining the debate concerning rational belief formation assuming that degrees of beliefs are best represented by real numbers in the unit interval [0, 1] ⊂ R. Anyone who rejects this premise will have to carefully assess whether the here presented account has implications on her line of thinking. Some of our results also hold true for degrees of belief represented by arbitrary positive real numbers. is a probability function, i.e., Bel * ∈ P. Similarly, forecasted events are 90 normally assumed to be ruled by an objective probability function P * , often 91 taken to be the distribution of one (or several) random variable(s). In both 92 applications, there exists a canonical probability function P ∈ P (either Bel *
93
or P * ) which can be used to aggregate losses incurred in different elementary 94 events. 
Statisticians consider degrees of belief which satisfy Prob. Their notion
99
of loss is thus only defined for probabilistic belief functions. For Bel ∈ P we 100 have that Bel is completely determined by {Bel(ω) | ω ∈ Ω}. In this case 101 we can regard L(ω, Bel) as only depending on the first argument, ω, and 102 {Bel(ω) | ω ∈ Ω}.
103
We shall here be interested in justifying Prob. We thus consider a more 
See [57] for an axiomatic characterization of S Brier . 
Strict Propriety for statistical Scoring Rules

123
We now turn to the key property: 
In plain English, strictly X-proper statistical SRs track probabilities, 127 whatever these probabilities are.
128
3 The original definition in [3] does not contain the formal expectation operator ω∈Ω P (ω)·. Rather, Brier envisioned a series of n forecasts which would all be scored by ω∈Ω (Bel i (ω) − E i,ω ) 2 where Bel i (ω) notates the i-th forecast in ω and E i,ω denotes indicator function for ω on the i-th occasion. The final score is then computed by dividing this sum by n. In essence, this amounts to taking expectations. 4 Our notion of strict X-propriety notably differs from Γ-strictness, see [20] . A SR is Γ-strict, if and only if for all P ∈ Γ ⊆ P it holds that arg inf Bel∈P S L (P, Bel) = {P }; Γ-strictness is thus a weakening of strict P-propriety. Strict B-propriety is a strengthening of strict P-propriety. Γ ⊆ P constraints the set of probability functions according to which expectations are computed, X is a set of belief functions containing P. and the X ⊆ Ω are referred to as propositions. This change in terminology is, of course, purely cosmetic.
165
In recent epistemic approaches, the basic unit of inaccuracy is the inac-166 curacy of Bel(X) at a world ω ∈ Ω, where proposition X is either true or 167 false at ω. Formally, the inaccuracy is represented by an inaccuracy function 168 I(X, v ω (X), Bel(X)). Since there may be reasons to treat different proposi- 
So, for a given world ω and a given belief function Bel, IM I sums the 177 inaccuracies over all propositions X ⊆ Ω of all beliefs Bel(X) with respect to 178 ω (or, depending on one's point of view, with respect to the at ω vindicated 179 credence function v ω ).
180
It is natural to think of I as some measure of distance between v ω (X) and
181
Bel(X). For example, measuring inaccuracy in Euclidean terms one could 182 consider 183 I(X, v ω (X), Bel(X)) =(1 − Bel(X)) 2 , if ω / ∈ X I(X, v ω (X), Bel(X)) =Bel(X) 2 , if ω / ∈ X .
Such an IM will formally be introduced in Definition 4.4.
184
The terminology in the literature has not yet converged. • for all p ∈ [0, 1] and all ∅ ⊂ X ⊂ Ω it holds that pI(X, 1,
209
• I(Ω, 1, x) + I(∅, 0, y) is uniquely minimised by x = 1 and y = 0.
210
Intuitively, strict propriety ensures that setting degrees of belief in X
211
equal to the probability of X is the only way to minimise expected inaccuracy, 212 see further Section 4.3.
213
In general, the second condition above is required because P (∅) = 0 and 214 P (Ω) = 1 for all P ∈ P and later on we want p to equal the probability of X.
215
Some authors do not allow I to depend on X, see for instance [44] . For 216 such a loss function the requirement that I(1, x) + I(0, y) is uniquely min-
217
imised by x = 1 and y = 0 is simply an instance of the first condition. For 218 such an I, the second condition follows from the first.
219
If IM I is strictly proper, then for all ω ∈ Ω and all X ⊆ Ω such that 220 ω ∈ X it holds that I(X, 1, Bel(X)) + I(X, 0, Bel(X)) is minimised, if and 221 only if Bel(X) = 1 and Bel(X) = 0. That is, Bel and v ω agree on X andX.
222
Hence, IM I (ω, Bel) is uniquely minimized by Bel = v ω . So, if ω * ∈ Ω is the 223 actual world, then the strictly least inaccurate belief function is Bel = v ω * .
224
In this sense, strictly proper IMs track the actual world. holds that lim n→∞ I(X, i, Bel n (X)) = I(X, i, Bel(X)), where both sides of 236 this equation may be equal to +∞.
237
The most popular IM is an epistemic version of the Brier Score S Brier :
238
Definition 4.4 (Brier IM). The Brier IM is defined as
In other words: 
Justifications of Probabilism
250
In justifications of norms of rational belief formation employing IMs it is 251 normally assumed that the agent has no information as to which world is the 
262
• For all Bel ∈ B \ P there exists some P ∈ P such that for all ω ∈ Ω
263
IM Brier (ω, Bel) > IM Brier (ω, P ).
264
• For all Bel ∈ P and all Bel ∈ B \ {Bel} there exists an ω ∈ Ω such • For all Bel ∈ B \ P there exists some P ∈ P such that for all ω ∈ Ω
272
IM I (ω, Bel) > IM I (ω, P ).
273
• For all Bel ∈ P and all Bel ∈ B \ {Bel} there exists an ω ∈ Ω such 274 that IM I (ω, Bel ) > IM I (ω, Bel).
275
Predd et al. credit Lindley (see [34] ) for a precursor of their result.
276
The first parts of these theorems say that every non-probabilistic belief 277 function Bel ∈ B \ P is strongly accuracy dominated by some probability 278 function and thus impermissible. The second parts mean that every proba-279 bilistic belief function Bel ∈ P is permissible, because no Bel ∈ P is weakly 280 accuracy dominated.
281
The two other main justifications of Prob along similar lines are due to an agent with degrees of belief Bel * (X) = 0 for all X ⊆ Ω would not be 325 threatened in her beliefs by strict propriety.
326
We conclude that assuming strict propriety for our purposes is ill-advised. has a clear impetus to minimise the expectation Bel
no fault with the requirement of "strict propriety" for eliciting beliefs from 338 subjective Bayesian agents, although I do object to it for the purposes belief 339 formation.
340
Belief elicitation is at heart an empirical problem, which is often tackled 
for some function L :
The name extended is somewhat unfortunate. Originally, it was intended 354 to capture the fact that the domain of the SR has been extended from P × P
355
to P × B and that the sum in (10) is over all events X ⊆ Ω and not merely 356 over the elementary events ω ∈ Ω as in (1).
357
For our running example, Brier Scores, we give the following extended
Brier is strictly B-proper.
360
Proof. The idea is to decompose S ext Brier (P, Bel) into pairs of summands,
361
where each pair is of the form
. We then show that each such pair is uniquely 363 minimised by Bel(X) = P (X) and Bel(X) = 1 − P (X).
364
Consider the following minimization problem for fixed P ∈ P, fixed X ⊆
365
Ω and x := Bel(X), y := Bel(X)
subject to
Note that the objective function of this minimisation problem is equal to
obtains for x = P (X) and y = 1 − P (X).
369
Hence, Bel = P uniquely minimizes S ext Brier (P, ·). 
373
• For all Bel ∈ B \ P there exists some P ∈ P such that for all
375
• For all Bel ∈ P and all Bel ∈ B \ {Bel} there exists a P ∈ P such that
Proof. 1) Let Bel ∈ B \ P. By Theorem 4.5 there exists a P Bel ∈ P such that
the fact that Ω is finite and that for all Q ∈ P there exists an ω ∈ Ω with respect to the probability functions Q ∈ P. 
The Canonical Association
387
In this section we shall see how to canonically associate with every IM an 388 extended SR. We shall give two further examples to illustrate the association.
389
Definition 5.5 (Canonical Association). For IM I define an associated sta-
by:
is an extended SR.
393
For a fixed IM IM I , S aso I (P, Bel) is simply the expected inaccuracy of Bel,
394
where expectations are computed with respect to the probability function 395 P ∈ P.
396
Theorem 5.6. IM I is strictly proper, if and only if S aso I
is strictly B-proper.
397
Proof. If IM I is strictly proper, then for every ∅ ⊂ X ⊂ Ω and all
is uniquely minimised by Bel(X) = P (X). all P ∈ P with P (ω) = p and P (ω ) = 1 − p for different ω, ω ∈ Ω we have
Now observe that every belief function Bel
imises each of the four sums above individually, since every sum only depends 406 on degrees of belief no other sum depends on.
407
By considering the first two sums for U = Ω and W = ∅ we find that 
Finally, note that the above arguments do not depend on ω ∈ Ω. We thus
Thus, IM I is strictly proper.
420
From a purely technical point of view, Theorem 5.6 can be most helpful.
421
All one needs to do to check whether a SR S sures in our sense is a rich class consisting of a great variety of members.
430
We now give two applications of Theorem 5.6 in which we generate ex-431 tended strictly B-proper SRs. The logarithmic IM (I log (X, 1, x) := − log(x),
432
I log (X, 0, x) := − log(1 − x)) and the spherical IM are well-known to be
see, e.g., [25, Section 8]).
435
Corollary 5.7. The following logarithmic SR is strictly B-proper.
As usual in this context, we put 0 · ∞ := 0 and r · ∞ = ∞ for r ∈ (0, 1].
437
By "log" we refer to a logarithm with an arbitrary base b > 1 and by
438
"ln" to the natural logarithm, i.e., with base e.
439
Corollary 5.8. The following spherical SR is strictly B-proper.
For our running example, Brier Scores, we already considered the canon- 
Justifying Probabilism with statistical Scoring Rules
445
In this section we build on Theorem 4.6 in order to obtain an epistemic 446 justification of Prob for rational belief formation. Bel ∈ B \ {Bel} there exists a
be strictly proper and let IM I be continuous.
470
• For all Bel ∈ B \ P there exists some P ∈ P such that for all Q ∈ P 471 S aso I (Q, Bel) > S aso I (Q, P ).
472
• For all Bel ∈ P and all Bel ∈ B \ {Bel} there exists a P ∈ P such that 473 S aso I (P, Bel ) > S aso I (P, Bel).
474
Proof. 1) Let Bel ∈ B \ P, then by Theorem 4.6 there exists a P Bel ∈ P such 475 that for all ω ∈ Ω it holds that
there exists some ω ∈ Ω such that Q(ω) > 0. We thus find for all Q ∈ P that is strictly B-proper, now apply Lemma 6.1. 
485
In order to make this justification compelling A -D need to be plausible. Prob supersedes the justification(s) of the further invoked norm(s).
583
In this section we give a single justification for Prob and Maximum Gen- 
587
Exactly as in the first part, we do not presuppose Prob, strict P-propriety 588 is hence of little use. The key notion will again be strict B-propriety.
589
As in the first part of this paper we focus on formal aspects of the justi- 
598
The justifications we give here apply to interpretations of P ∈ E as epis-599 temic subjective probabilities or as objective probabilities. 
The general Arguments
601
Consider an agent with current evidence which narrows the chance func-602 tion down to a non-empty and convex set ∅ ⊂ E ⊆ P. E is called the set of Maximum Entropy Principle (MaxEnt) A rational agent ought to adopt a probability function Bel ∈ E which maximises Shannon Entropy, H log
The probability function P = ∈ P defined by P = (ω) := is as similar to P = as possible.
613
MaxEnt has given rise to a substantial literature on rational belief for- We can express Shannon Entropy in terms of this SR, H log (P ) = S log (P, P ).
618
MaxEnt is well-known to be justified on the following grounds of WCEL S log (P, Bel) = arg sup
and there is only one unique such function maximising Shannon Entropy,
So, an agent which aims to minimise sup P ∈E S L (P, Bel) by adopting a 625 probabilistic belief function Bel ∈ P, i.e., avoiding worst-case expected loga-626 rithmic loss, has to adopt P † as her belief function.
627
We now generalise this well-known justification of MaxEnt to strictly X-
628
proper SRs which satisfy the following minimax equation 
Proof. Let us first use (22) and the fact that S L is strictly X-proper to obtain
Since E is convex, closed and non-empty the function S L (P, P ) has a unique 640 supremum in E. That is, the set arg sup P ∈E ω∈Ω S L (P, P ) consists of a 641 unique probability function which is in E, P ‡ .
Using X-strict propriety to obtain the strict inequality in (27) we find for
Recall 
Note that we do not require that E is convex nor that E is closed.
662
Proof. First note that
For all Bel ∈ X \ {P ‡ } we find using strict X-propriety of S L that
For the belief function P ‡ we find 
680
Straightforward calculations show that Brier Entropy H Brier (P ) and the
681
Spherical Entropy H Sph (P ) are strictly concave on P. The entropy of the 682 logarithmic SR is H PΩ (P ) := X⊆Ω −P (X) log(P (X)) which we shall prove 683 in Section 9.1. This entropy is called Proposition Entropy in [29] . Clearly,
684
H PΩ is strictly concave on P.
685
Note that H PΩ is different from Shannon Entropy, H log . In H PΩ the sum 
693
These three entropies have different maximisers on rather simple sets E,
694
as can be gleaned from Figure 1 and Figure 2 . ω, ω ∈ Ω it holds that L(ω, P = ) = L(ω , P = ).
705
Theorem 7.5 (Generalised Entropies and PoI). If S L is equivocator neutral,
706
strictly X-proper with P ⊆ X ⊆ B, satisfies (24) and if H L (P ) is strictly
So, under complete ignorance, E = P, the unique rational choice under
709
WCEL avoidance is Bel = P = ; this provides a justification of the PoI. For a 710 recent justification of the PoI using IMs we refer the reader to [46] .
711
Proof. From Theorem 7.2 and the fact that P is convex and closed we obtain
Note that since S L is equivocator neutral, there exists some constant 713 c ∈ R such that for all ω ∈ Ω it holds that L(ω, P = ) = c.
714
Assume for contradiction that there exists some Q ∈ arg sup P ∈P H L (P ) 715 which is different from P = . Since H L (P ) is a strictly concave function on P
716
the maximum of H L (·) has to be unique and hence H L (Q) > H L (P ). We 717 then obtain using (38)
= sup
Contradiction. Thus, {P = } = arg sup P ∈P H L (P ).
719
Equivocator neutrality is a very weak symmetry condition on L. Strict 
725
Not only is the equivocator the unique function minimising WCEL under 726 complete ignorance, it is also the unique such function as long as P = ∈ E:
727 Corollary 7.6. For a SR S L as in Theorem 7.5 and for all sets E ⊂ P such
Proof. First, let us reason as in Theorem 7.5 to obtain the equality below
Using strict propriety we find for all belief functions Bel ∈ X \ {P = } that
So all belief functions different from the equivocator P = have a strictly sub-
732
optimal WCEL. P = has the best possible WCEL as we saw in Theorem 7.5.
733
It follows that 
Local Scoring Rules
739
We now turn our attention to strictly B-proper statistical SRs themselves.
740
S log stands out as the only strictly P-proper local SR and as the heart of Max- Subsequently, we will take an interest in notions of locality applied to
745
SRs defined on P × B. Surprisingly, the most natural way of extending the 746 notion of locality to P × B is incompatible with strict B-propriety. 
750
Abusing the notation in the usual way we write L(Bel(ω)).
751
The class of such SRs which are strictly P-proper is rather simple: 
Note that only beliefs in elementary events appear in the above expression.
772
Thus, beliefs in non-elementary events will not affect the score S L (P, Bel). 
Ex-locality here means that L(X, Bel) is of the form L loc (X, Bel(X)), i.e. into (57). More precisely, the only summand depending on Bel(X) is P (X) ·
796
L loc (X, Bel(X)). Since P is a probability function, P (∅) = 0 holds. Hence,
797
by our convention that 0 · ∞ = 0 we obtain
Bel(∅).
800
Hence, a belief function Bel a which agrees with P on all events ∅ ⊂ X ⊆ Ω
801
and Bel(∅) = a with a ∈ (0, 1] it holds that S ext L loc
Thus, no ex-local SR is strictly B-proper.
803
One might initially think that the incompatibility of ex-locality and strict Proof. It is sufficient to show that for all P ∈ P 813 arg inf
does not depend on P , since strict B − -propriety would require that the above 814 minimum obtains uniquely for Bel = P .
815
For a fixed loss function L loc and a fixed event ∅ ⊂ X ⊆ Ω it holds that Proof. Define a belief function Bel 1 ∈ B by Bel 1 (X) := 1 for all X ⊆ Ω. For 827 all P ∈ P and all X ⊆ Ω it holds that P (X) log(Bel 1 (X)) = 0. So, for all
Recall from Theorem 8.2 that the logarithmic SR S log is the only local P-strictly proper statistical SR. Evidently, strict propriety crucially depends 832 on the set of scored belief functions.
833
The SR considered in Corollary 5.7: S aso log (P, Bel) := X⊆Ω P (X)·(− log(Bel(X))− 834 log(1 − Bel(X))) is not ex-local. The loss term depends on Bel(X) and
835
Bel(X). is strictly B-proper.
849
Proposition 9.1. The following extended SR is strictly B-proper
This SR is not purely logarithmic since it contains the penalty term, it is thus global.
855
Proof. Define an IM IM llog by I(X, 0, Bel(X)) : = Bel(X) I(X, 1, Bel(X)) : = Bel(X) − 1 − ln(Bel(X)) .
We now show that IM llog is strictly proper. Clearly, IM llog is never strictly 856 less than zero.
857
Let p ∈ [0, 1] and ∅ ⊂ X ⊂ Ω be fixed and let
By equating the derivative of f (Bel(X)) with zero we find for p > 0
Trivially, this equation is uniquely solved by Bel(X) = p > 0. Considering 860 the second derivative of f (Bel(X)) shows that Bel(X) = p > 0 is the unique 861 minimum.
862
For p = 0 we recall the usual convention that 0 ln(Bel(X)) = 0, even if
is uniquely minimised by Bel(X) = p = 0.
865
For X = ∅ and X = Ω we have 
870
The constant term, − |PΩ| 2 , has been added for the following cosmetic reason.
871
For Bel ∈ P we have 
= S ext log (P, Bel) .
So, for Bel ∈ P we recapture the SR considered in Proposition 8.5 (for the 873 natural logarithm) and we note that functions considered are in some set B norm ⊃ P.
887
We shall now quickly summarise the relevant points in proper for all such g.
895
Note that since P ⊂ B norm , strict B norm -propriety is well defined in the 896 sense of Definition 3.2.
897
The above proposition does not contradict Theorem 8. 
